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NOTE: The following list of themes is not to be considered exhaustive or mandatory in all circumstances but is intended to indicate some of the major ideas which, with various adaptations, should be recurrently stressed from time to time to give coherence and direction to our information programs aimed at exploiting unrest in the European Satellites.

1. Not Only Bread, But Freedom

Emphasize the real nature of the "German Revolt," following on the heels of the Czechoslovak uprisings, as a dynamic demonstration of the pent-up feelings of a people longing for freedom from communist tyranny. The spark which set off the original spontaneous riots in East Berlin--workers' demands for lower norms--should be played secondary to the major theme of general demands for with-drawal of Soviet troops, free elections, unity, etc.

2. Return To Europe

Promote the "Return to Europe" concept as a driving force within the countries now behind the Iron Curtain and cut off from Europe, pointing to integration moves in the West, appropriate statements at Strausbourg, and the activities of the "European Union" as manifestations of this force; describe the "Return to Europe" idea as a thread which can bind together all peoples of Eastern Europe in their efforts to throw off the Soviet yoke.

3. Soviet Power Is Running Down

Prevalence of irrepressible resistance in satellite Europe should be treated as further evidence that "Soviet power is over the hill and running down," and that popular uprisings such as

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these in East Germany are further proof of the inevitability of victory for the democratic forces.

4. The Too-Thin Red Line

In output to the Soviet Union especially, the Kremlin's ability to deal forever with these recurrent break-outs in its tenuous empire should be severely questioned, and a Soviet eriticism of the Kremlin's self-defeating strategy should be emphasized.

5. Fear The Russians Bearing Gifts

Ridicule the Soviet propaganda line about the "warm and enduring friendship" between the non-Russian satellites and the USSR, capitalizing on every strike, every riot, every overt evidence of unrest as a sign that history, tradition, and fundamental differences such as race, religion, and mores are really at the core of the trouble—that these uprisings are simply expressions of much more deep-seated resentment of Soviet oppression.

6. <u>'48 Again?</u>

Explore the connotations in different areas of the revolutionary movements of 1848, to determine whether the symbol "48" can be used effectively to crystallize resistance today. Wherever the results of the study are negative, choose other historic parallels which are locally appropriate.

7. Pilsen--The New Cradle Of Liberty

Special programs directed to Czechoslovakia should give credit to the Czechs, especially in Pilsen, for having taken the lead in showing real resistance to the Soviets. Programs to Germany which might be overheard in Czechoslovakia should emphasize the "common bond" of freedom from tyranny which no man-made borders can block,

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but we should avoid giving the Germans credit for sparking these outbreaks. An effort should be made to assuage the "guilt complex" reported running through the people of Pilsen now, for not having followed through. This double-play of credit must be discreetly and carefully handled because of the German-Czech antipathies and the likelihood that one audience may well eavesdrop on what is being said to the other. The real point is to give credit where credit is due, avoiding any implications that either party failed to act as perhaps it might have, and emphasizing the deep-seated community of interest which joins people of all oppressed nations.

8. Freedom And Food

We should stress the better standards of living in West Berlin, than in East Berlin especially with respect to food. In this connection, we could contrast the West Berlin food stockpile with the scarcities in the East (as long as they last) made worse by the "Workers' Army" drain on what little there is there. We could imply that the food stocks in the West are not packaged in party politics—that this food could be available to the East Berliners if the Soviets would grant the peoples' demand to unify the city, instead of sealing it off with tanks and armored columns. We could also imply, if not actually recommend, that West Berlin could provide food relief stations in East Berlin if the barriers were down and proper safeguards were guaranteed.

9. <u>88 Million Provocateurs</u>

Every opportunity should be taken to refute the Soviet charges of U.S. instigation of the uprisings in Germany, without over-protestation and with diversive counter-suggestions wherever possible.

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The news itself should be used to disprove these allegations: We should ridicule the charges being made by the Soviets concerning the U.S. by pointing to the uselessness of our providing saboteurs and rebels—there are obviously millions of home-made insurgents churning through Germany today with a lot more at stake than a U.S. agent could possibly have.

10. War of Nerves

The more information we can play back to the East with facts and figures the better we should be able to convince the Russians, or at least stimulate their suspicions, that all their efforts to control the people have failed. RIAS should be used more and more to carry on a kind of "nerve war" against the Russians emphasizing its importance to the people of Eastern Europe as a contact with the West and reaffirming its credibility and reliability as a source of the truth. We should maintain the impression, backed up by facts, that the barriers which the Russians have found necessary to impose on the East Germans are not effective; we are getting the news and

11. "Loyal" Labor Is Slave Labor

Soviet calls to "loyal workers" to take over industries crippled European by strikes should be played back to all Eastern/targets in the framework of the UN "forced labor" study, making it clear that we understand what the Soviets mean by "loyalty" -- labor performed at pistol-point. This should be described as the low-water mark in inhumanity and symbolic of the society to which the Soviets have reduced the people under their control. This should be especially pertinent if reports of uprisings at the Aue uranium mines are confirmed since the mines are known to be a forced-labor camp, and

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"loyalty" there is meaningless.

12. "Ivan. Go Home"

We should never let the Soviets forget their use of armed might to deal in human relationships. Continued demands by Western authorities, both German and others, for an explanation of this show of force would bring a sorry response, if any, from the Soviets, and add fuel to the "Ivan, Go Home" line. This could be enhanced by whatever use the Soviets make of the Wehrmacht officers, if they ever get them: committing "genocide" against a class of Germans on trumped-up scapegoat grounds, or turning them into "loyal" servants of the Kremlin, again at pistol-point.

13. The New Cuislings

Otto Grotewohl should be made symbolic of the puppets trying to act like statesmen all over Eastern Europe. His traitorous conduct over the past years, climaxed by his calling on Soviet tanks and machine guns to bail him out, should be made to stick in the craw not only of the Germans, who need no help from us in this respect, but of other Eastern Europeans. The whole concept of "quislings" in the satellite states should be made a recurrent propaganda line, and efforts should be made also to discredit all the "junior puppets," of the Nuschke variety, who appear anxious to take over if and when the dust settles on the incumbents. Any encouragement to the people in Eastern Europe to rid themselves of these puppets will have a strong psychological, if not actual, impact. Further, the contrast between uprisings of this nature especially, and the stability and moral strength of the Western world, will prove the fundamental validity of our position.

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14. Run For Your Life

We should also suggest that if and when the Soviets recover control in East Germany (and elsewhere, if the uprisings spread abroad), Kremlin-ordered purges will be initiated to "clean up" the Armed Forces, the puppet Governments, and other controlmechanisms. In other words, everyone will face the possibility of death or slave-labor, no matter how small his role. Events and rumors both should be used extensively to bolster this line, adding fuel to the flames of suspicion wherever possible.

15. Special Military Defection Themes

Armed forces,

By covert means, in programs aimed at the Soviet States, we should foster distrust in the Army high command, and suspicions of the uses to which the Army is being put, especially suggesting that the MVD may be manipulating the Army for its own ends. To the enlisted men and junior officers, it should be stressed that the MVD is afraid to permit them even the off-duty pleasures normal in Western armies. Another line of attack would be to ask the soldieraudience whether putting down workers! demands for decent conditions is the kind of duty to be expected of an intensively-trained "workers' army". In programs to satellite personnel, we should make it plain that "patriots" who can act for liberty and remain hidden should do so; those who cannot stay should be assured of asylum in the West. Lesser communist officials who turn on the regime may be assured their efforts will be their passport to the West.

16. Free Elections

In the political framework, our propaganda should continue to insist on free elections leading to unification, but without giving

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credence to the Soviet maneuvers to make concessions in Eastern Germany which would permit anti-European integration forces to look upon such moves as real accomodations. If we commit the Soviets to withdraw their forces, they cannot afford to do it, especially in the light of what has gone on this week. If by some chance they do call us, we should emphasize that the withdrawal has been forced by the rebellion, and that in turn makes it apparent that East Germany is free to vote as it will. We should be prepared to take immediate steps to promote free all-German elections, meanwhile continuing to regard the uprisings in the East and the forced withdrawal of the Soviets as proof of Western strength, in spiritual rather than in military terms.

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17. The Informers

Turn the "guilt" now laid to the strikers by the communists, on the informers who play into the hands of the Security Police, the VOPOS and the Russian military, emphasizing that this is a trend of events, and to obstruct the will of the people as evidenced by these uprisings is to betray the cause of freedom.

18. Freedom's Price

In connection with the "food campaign" in Item 8, point out that foregoing party ration cards temporarily, in order to achieve freedom especially when that freedom can make Western food supplies available, is a far lesser accrifice than has been made by national heroes of the past in the revolutions against tyranny which mark the history of the world.

19. "Second-String" Bosses

Warn possible "second-string" communists who may take over if the principals have given way (either by defection or by violence), that their let can be no better in the long run; the people will continue to press their demands for justice and freedom, and the puppets in power will be answerable to the people, even if they escape the next Soviet purge.

20. The Soviet Bite

Remind the workers and the peasants that every decline in per capita food production within the USSR—every failure of the satellites to deliver their existing quotas—will merely intensify the demand on the remaining production centers, to satisfy the Soviet maw at the expense of non-Russian forced labor.

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21. Rebels in the FDJ

Make liberal use of the VOPOS' murder of the 17-year old FDJ rebel who escaped to the French Sector of Berlin, as well as of the participation of a large proportion of FDJ members in the Zone-wide rebellion, as rallying points for expressions of sympathy and understanding by youth groups in the free world (such as the Boy Scouts, the 4-H Clubs, Police Athletic Leagues, Junior Chambers of Commerce, etc., in the U.S.); also expand this theme by contrasting the role of youth in the free world by the enforced militarism and intellectual oppression to which youth in communist countries are subjected.

22. Workers of the World

Wherever possible, promote and publicize any bonds of sympathy between industrial firms in the free world whose counterparts in Germany and elsewhere have been affected by the uprising, of course pegging such ties to the workers, rather than to management (Kodak is one example; General Motors or Ford might be another, if substantiated by the facts.)

23. Friends of the People

Play back the communist line that "if your enemies praise you, you have erred" with reaffirmation of the Allied principle of sympathy and understanding for the <u>people</u> of the Iron Curtain countries: "We are enemies only of the Soviet tyranny, and we attack that tyranny because it is an error, and has itself, in Germany at least, admitted that it has erred."

24. Empty Words

Ridicule the promises of "voluntary cooperation", more "contact with the masses", further concessions to the "bourgeois parties" as being typical of the empty phrases, the semantic and dialectic tricks which the

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communists have used for 30 years in dealing with the people: words meaning nothing; whole, sweeping actions are the only answer to the peoples! demand for freedom.

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